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I. INTRODUCTION
My assignment is to consider the emerging international norms and
how they might affect implementation of the American Bar Association
(ABA) resolution calling for a moratorium on the imposition and
enforcement of the death penalty.' The American Bar Association
* Vice Provost, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law, and Director of International
Legal Studies Program, University of Denver.
1. The language of the ABA's resolution follows:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association calls upon each jurisdiction that
imposes capital punishment not to carry out the death penalty until the jurisdiction
implements policies and procedures that are consistent with the following longstanding
American Bar Association policies intended to (1) ensure that death penalty cases are
administered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due process, and (2) minimize
the risk that innocent persons may be executed; ...
(i) Implementing ABA "Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases" (adopted Feb. 1989) and Association policies intended to
encourage competency of counsel in capital cases (adopted Feb. 1979, Feb. 1988, Feb.
1990, Aug. 1996);
(ii) Preserving, enhancing, and streamlining state and federal courts' authority and
responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the merits of constitutional claims
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resolution calls attention to the unfair and unjust practices and procedures
with which the death penalty is carried out in the United States. I have
looked at the various aspects of the resolution's goals - providing
competent legal counsel at all stages of the conviction, sentencing, and
appeals processes; preserving due process, especially in adjudication of
constitutional claims in state post-conviction proceedings and in federal
habeas corpus proceedings; elimination of discrimination in death
sentences on the basis of race of either the victim or the defendant; and
prevention of execution of persons who were juveniles under the age of
eighteen or mentally retarded at the time they committed their offenses.
In my allotted time, however, I will begin with a glance at selected
recent major developments in international fora regarding capital
punishment. This will be followed by a comparison between the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international human
rights instruments as they bear on the death penalty. Then I will discuss
primarily three aspects: racial discrimination, the execution of juveniles,
and the execution of mentally retarded persons.
Coincidentally, the day of the ABA vote, February 3, 1997, was
also marked by the decision announced in Gomez v. Acevedo, 2 in which a
panel of the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Federal Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 19963 narrows the scope of federal habeas
in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings (adopted Aug. 1982,
Feb. 1990);
(iii) Striving to eliminate discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of the race
of either the victim or the defendant (adopted Aug. 1988, Aug. 1991); and
(iv) Preventing execution of mentally retarded persons (adopted Feb. 1989) and
persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses (adopted Aug.
1983).
FURTHER RESOLVED, That in adopting this recommendation, apart from existing
Association policies relating to offenders who are mentally retarded or under the age
of 18 at the time of the commission of the offenses, the Association takes no position
on the death penalty.
See James Podgers, Time Out for Executions -ABA Action at the Midyear Meeting is Expected
to Stir Renewed Debate on the Death Penalty, 83 A.B.A.J. 26 (Apr. 1997); Gina Chon, ABA
Reinvigorates Death Penalty Debate, 24 HuM. RTS. 8 (Spring 1997). For a comprehensive
study on the implementation of the ABA's recommendation regarding the moratorium, see
Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding implementation of the American Bar
Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a
Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3 (1996) [hereinafter Coyne &
Entzerothj.
2. Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Oct. 6, 1997, 1997
U.S. LEXIS 4568.
3. 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
Nanda
corpus review of state court decisions in capital cases. The panel held that
the new section 2254(d) of Title 28 (28 U.S.C. 2254(d))4 mandates that
federal courts give deferential review to state court decisions on claims
pertaining to sufficiency of the evidence., The court held that the new
section 2254(d)(1) requires only deferential review for reasonableness on
mixed questions in habeas proceedings.6 The court said that it was
compelled to hold that a writ of habeas corpus may be issued
for evidence insufficiency only if the state courts have
unreasonably applied the Jackson' standard. Federal review of
these claims, therefore, now turns on whether the state court
provided fair process and engaged in reasoned, good-faith
decision making when applying Jackson's no rational trier of
fact test., As we stated in Lindh, section 2254(d)(1), requires
federal courts to take into account the care with which the state
court considered the subject. . . . [A] responsible, thoughtful
answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to
support the judgment. 9
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA REGARDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
The movement to ban capital punishment worldwide has been
ongoing at the United Nations and in other international fora since the
1960s.10 In 1968 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
resolution declaring the objective of gradually but progressively restricting
4. This section prohibits federal courts from granting a writ of habeas corpus on a claim
adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless such adjudication 1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding.
5. Gomez, 106 F.3d at 193-94.
6. Id. at 199, citing Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870-71 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc),
cert. granted in part, 117 S.Ct. 726 (1997).
7. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (which expanded the availability of the writ
of habeas corpus).
8. There the court had said that a federal court may grant habeas relief only "if it is found
that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324.
9. Gomez, 106 F.3rd at 199, quoting Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871.
10. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993); Ariane M. Schreiber, Note, States That Kill: Discretion and the
Death Penalty - A Worldwide Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263 (1996).
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the range of offenses punishable by death." Two decades later, in 1989,
the General Assembly adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 obligating each state
party to "take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its
jurisdiction," and acknowledging a worldwide effort to abolish capital
punishment for all purposes. 3
In 1994 a United Nations draft resolution called for a worldwide
moratorium on capital punishment and for a global ban on the death
penalty by the year 2000.'4 Although the resolution was rejected by the
General Assembly's Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee by a
vote of 44 to 33, there were 74 abstentions," which left the door open for
such initiatives in the future. More recently, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights has called for the abolition of the death
penalty.'6
In international fora, the American Convention on Human Rights
in 1978 forbade capital punishment for "political offenses or related
common crimes" and prohibited the execution of "persons who, at the time
the crime was committed, were under eighteen years of age or over
seventy years of age," or pregnant women. 7 The Convention limited the
death penalty to only the most serious crimes, and mandated that it "shall
not be reestablished in the states that have abolished it," and that its
application "shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently
apply."8 Subsequently, the 1984 Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty resolved "in accordance with
the spirit of Article 4 [of the Convention] and the universal trend to
eliminate the death penalty, [to] call on all countries in the Americas to
abolish it. "'9
11. UN GAOR 3rd Comm., 23d Sess., agenda item 59, U.N. Doc. A/Res./2393 (XXIII)
(1968).
12. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., supp.
no. 98, operative para. 2, U.N. Doc. A1RESI441128 (1990).
13. Id. at Annex, art. 1(2).
14. See E. Leopold, U.N. Panel Defeats Resolution on Capital Punishment, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Dec. 10, 1997 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
15. Id.
16. The vote last year was 27 in favor to 11 against with 14 abstentions.
17. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
O.A.S.T.S. no. 36, at 1, art. 4 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
18. Id.
19. Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 1984-1985, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser. L./V./II. 77 doc. 10 rev. 1, at 10 (1985).
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In Europe, Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,20 which was entered into
force in 1953, recognized capital punishment as an exception to the right to
life. In 1985, however, European states adopted Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty.2 ' It
declared the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace. Article 1 of
the Protocol explicitly states, "The death penalty shall be abolished. No
one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed." Its Preamble states
that the Protocol had its genesis in the recognition that several member
states of the Council of Europe had experienced an evolution which
"expresses a general tendency in favor of abolition of the death penalty." 22
Under the Protocol, parties are still allowed to impose death sentences for
acts committed in time of war or during a time of imminent threat of war.2 3
No reservations are permitted to any of its provisions.24 In October 1997,
the Council of Europe, meeting in Strasbourg, endorsed a moratorium on
capital punishment. Among the prior holdouts, Ukraine and Russia have
now signed the Sixth Protocol and are committed to abolition.
Among the fifty-three members of the organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the United States now stands alone in opposing
the moratorium on the death penalty or its abolition. In extradition cases,
the United States is consistently being refused extradition by many
countriesP until it gives undertakings not to impose the death penalty on the
extraditee.
The United States, having ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 26 the Convention Against Torture and
20. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
21. Protocol No. 6 of the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signature April 28, 1983,
E.T.S. No. 114, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 538 (1983) (entered into force March 1, 1985).
22. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (1962).
In 1973, the Council adopted a resolution stating that capital punishment was "inhuman and
degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the European Convention." Eur. Consult. Assin.,
25th Sess., Doc. No. 3297, at 2 (1973).
23. Id. art. 2.
24. Id. art. 4.
25. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS THE DEATH
PENALTY, A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 85 (1989); John Palk, Note -Canadian Extradition and the
Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1993).
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"7, and the
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD),2 is obligated under international law to comply with their
various applicable provisions pertaining to capital punishment. These
obligations exist notwithstanding the various reservations, understandings,
and declarations that relate to the practice and procedures of death penalty
sentencing within the United States, for example, the United States
reservation regarding imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.2 9 In
addition, even though the United States has simply signed but not ratified
the Convention on the Rights of the Child,1° since the signing was without
reservations, it could be argued under the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties3 that the United States must not violate the Convention
provision which bans execution of those who committed the offense while
younger than eighteen.
It may be recalled that the ICCPR includes the obligation on state
parties to "respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction" the basic right of nondiscrimination,3 2 the right
to a fair trial, 33 and specific rights in respect of death penalty sentencing3
Although the Covenant does not prohibit the death penalty, it restricts the
application of capital punishment with special safeguards and with a view
to its ultimate abolition .3  The Race Convention obligates parties to
"pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
27. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1984/72, Annex (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
28. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter ICERD].
29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 19(c), 115
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980): the reservation must not be "incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty." [hereinafter Vienna Convention.].
30. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda
Item 108, UN Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989).
31. Vienna Convention, supra note 29, art. 18 (a) (a state that has signed a treaty "is
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [that] treaty").
32. ICCPR, supra note 26, arts. 2, 26.
33. Id. arts. 2, 14.
34. Id. arts. 2, 6.
35. Id. art. 6.
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racial discrimination in all its forms." 36 It includes the right to equal
treatment before the courts.37
Two general comments are in order. First, in 1996 the
International Commission of Jurists sent a fact finding mission to the
United States to study the administration of the death penalty in this
country - to investigate both federal and state practices and procedures in
respect of capital punishment sentencing. 38  It found that almost no
attention was given to accepted international norms in the administration of'
the death penalty in the United States, specifically to United States
obligations under the ICCPR and the ICERD. 9 The ICJ urged "the United
States and other countries with death penalty sentencing . . . to take the
necessary steps to ensure that there is greater compliance with their
international obligations. "40
Second, in light of the United States ratification of these
instruments, it is necessary to revisit Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford v.
Kentucky,'1 when he wrote for the plurality that sentencing practices of
foreign countries, if they did not reflect American conceptions of decency,
were not relevant. In his words,
we emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency
that are dispositive, rejecting the contention . . . that the
sentencing practices of other countries are relevant. While
the practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a
practice uniform among our people is not merely an
historical accident, but rather so implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, that it occupies a place not merely in our
mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,.
• they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment
prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our
people.' 2
36. ICERD, supra note 28, art. 2.
37. Id. art. 5(a).
38. For a report, see International Commission of Jurists, Administration of the Death
Penalty in the United States, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 165 (1997) [hereinafter ICJ Report].
39. Id. at 169.
40. Id. at 170.
41. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
42. Id. at 369 n.1, quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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It is useful to recall that a year earlier in Thompson v. Oklahoma,"
in which the question was whether the implementation of a death sentence
on a person who was fifteen years of age when he committed a capital
crime would violate the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, the Court held that the execution of any person under the age
of sixteen at the time of the offense would violate the Eighth Amendment
guarantees. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion held that "it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than
sixteen years old at the time of his or her offense,"" and interpreted
evolving standards of decency in the light of standards under international
law as well as the practices of other nations,' 4 specifically citing the
practices of western European democracies. It was in Trop v. Dulles"
that, while analyzing and interpreting the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme
Court observed that the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society" must be considered.
47
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
"cruel and unusual punishments" shall not be inflicted. The comparable
language under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."" This language is identical to that
used in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Among other
international instruments of human rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights stipulates that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."10
Several decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights have interpreted the language of
Article 3 of the European Convention to develop definitional distinctions
43. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
44. Id. at 830.
45. Thonpson, 487 U.S. at 830-31.
46. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
47. Id. at 101.
48. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 7.
49. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., at 71, art. 5, U.N. Doec. A/810 (1948).
50. European Convention, supra note 20, art. 3.
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between torture and "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."'
Also, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has interpreted Article
7 of the ICCPR's prohibitions on torture and cruel and inhuman
treatment . 2 It has also interpreted the ICCPR "to prohibit extradition to a
jurisdiction where the extradites faces a real risk, that his rights under
ICCPR will be violated. This position is consonant with the European
Court's interpretation of the European Convention in Soering v. United
Kingdom." In Soering, the Court ruled that the "death row phenomenon"
in the United States,5 ' which potentially faced the defendant were he
sentenced to capital punishment, would violate the accused's rights under
the European Convention.
These interpretations should inform the United States Supreme
Court in its analysis of the Eighth Amendment, since they are much
broader in their reach of what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment
than the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the comparable
Eighth Amendment language of cruel and unusual punishment.
IV. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
In August 1988, the American Bar Association adopted the following
policy in opposition to discrimination in capital sentencing:
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association
opposes discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of
the race of either the victim or the defendant.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar
Association supports the enactment of federal and state
legislation which strives to eliminate any racial
discrimination in capital sentencing which may exist. 5
Several studies have shown how racial discrimination based on the
race of the victim or the defendant affects the imposition of capital
punishment. These include studies by the National Association for the
51. See generally David Heffernan, Comment- America the Cruel and Unusual? An
Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 481, 518-30
(1996).
52. See id. at 530-37.
53. Id. at 539, citing Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) (1989).
54. On the death row phenomenon, see ICJ Report, supra note 38, at 206-09.
55. ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (1988). For a thorough discussion, see
Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 1, at 34-40.
56. See id. at 34-37.
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Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational Fund; a
comprehensive statistical analysis of racial discrimination in capital cases
by Professor David Baldus, who took into account 230 non-racial factors
and still found that even if they "might legitimately influence a sentencer,
the jury more likely than not would have spared [the defendant's] life had
his victim been black;" 7 and a 1990 General Accounting office report
reviewing twenty-eight different empirical studies that examined racial
discrimination in capital cases with its conclusion that these studies clearly
showed a pattern "indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing
and imposition of the death penalty."
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 59 the Court held that statistical evidence of
racial disproportion in death sentences does not demonstrate arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory application of the death penalty.6 The Court
held that the Baldus study, which demonstrated that blacks who kill whites
are sentenced to death "at nearly twenty-two times the rate of blacks who
kill blacks, and more than seven times the rate of whites who kill blacks. "61
In a five to four opinion, the Court held that the statistical study did not
demonstrate a risk of racial bias in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 6 It
also rejected McCleskey's Fourteenth Amendment claim for his failure to
show intentional discrimination.63
The International Commission of Jurists' Mission to the United
States found that "the Race Convention's prescription of effects-based
discrimination (Article 2(c) of the ICERD) extends to areas of disparate
impact-discrimination not currently proscribed under United States law in
the United States.""4
In response to the Supreme Court's finding in McCleskey that
problems of racism in death penalty cases "are best presented to the
legislative bodies, "0 there have been several bills introduced in the United
States Congress since 1988 to remedy the situation presented by these
studies. These bills are aimed at giving the condemned a federal right to
57. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 325 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting, citing Baldus
study).
58. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990).
59. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 325 (1987).
60. See id. at 292-93.
61. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting, citing Baldus study).
62. Id. at 313.
63. Id. at 297-99.
64. ICJ Report, supra note 38, at 203.
65. McKclesky, 481 U.S. at 319.
582 [Vol. 4:573
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challenge any death sentence that "furthers a racially discriminatory
pattern" based on the race of either the defendant or the victim. The
defendant may support his or her challenge by statistical proof and without
the necessity of showing discriminatory intent, motive or purpose.
In 1994, the House of Representatives passed the Racial Justice
Act, under which proof of significant racial discrimination in the
administration of capital sentencing would have required the prosecutor to
show a non-race based explanation for the death sentence." However, the
bill has not yet been enacted into law.67 The ICJ Mission has said that a
failure to enact the Racial Justice Act "would constitute a breach of the
United States government's express ratification of the ICCPR and the
ICERD - particularly of Articles 6(1), 6(2) and Article 26 read with
Article 2(2) of the . . . ICCPR, and of Articles 2(1) and 5(a) of . . . the
ICERD."6 It added:
The mission is conscious of the final reservation taken, [by
the United States] to the [ICCPR] and to the [ICERD],
namely that their provisions are not self-executing [citation
omitted]. But this reservation touches upon the non-
enforceability of international instruments under domestic
law, and does not effect a conclusion based upon non-
implementation of the provisions of the [ICCPR and of the
[ICERD].
The Mission is of the considered opinion that in the
absence of a nation-wide law framed on the pattern of the
Racial Justice Act, the administration of capital punishment
in the United States will continue to be arbitrary, and
definitely not in consonance with Articles 6 and 40 of the
[ICCPR].-
The Mission's report concludes that:
(b) Change in United States law is mandated by the
provisions of Article 2(c) of the [ICERD], which was
ratified by the United States in 1984 without any
reservation being taken on this provision.
66. H.R. 4017, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994).
67. See generally E. Chemerisky, Eliminatina Racial Discrimination in Administration of
the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519 (1995).
68. ICJ Report, supra note 38, at 204.
69. Id. at 204.
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(c) Even in the absence of such change, the Mission
submits that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the
United States Constitution (Article VI Clause 2) broader
treaty obligations under the [ICERD] would furnish the
Controlling Rule of the Law in the United States.0
V. EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS
In February 1989, the ABA adopted a policy prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded persons:
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar Association urges
that no person with mental retardation, as defined by the
American Association on Mental Retardation, should be
sentenced to death and execution; and
Be It Further Resolved, that the American Bar Association
supports enactment of legislation barring the execution of
defendants with mental retardation."
The American Association of Mental Retardation adopted in 1992 a revised
definition of mentally retarded person:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in
present functioning. It is characterized by significantly
sub-average intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in two or more of the following
applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.
Mental retardation manifests before age eighteen."
In 1989, in deciding Penry v. Lynaugh," the United States
Supreme Court held that the execution of a mentally retarded prisoner
would not violate the Eighth Amendment. While a psychiatrist had
testified that the defendant was suffering from a brain disorder at the time
of the offense so that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his
70. Id. at 212.
71. ABA, Swumary of Action of the House of Delegates, 1989 Midyear Meeting, Feb.
1989.
72. Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 1, at n. 40.
73. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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conduct and was unable to conform his conduct to the law,"7 the Court said
that "in the absence of better evidence of a national consensus against
execution of the retarded, mental age should not be adopted as a line-
drawing principle in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."71
Accordingly, the Court declined to hold that "the Eighth Amendment
precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability
[with the reasoning capacity of a seven-year-old] convicted of a capital
offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone. "76 It should
be noted that the decision was five to four and Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens considered executing mentally retarded
persons as unconstitutional.
Examples show that some severely psychologically impaired
individuals have been executed in the United States." In one capital case,
Judge Fitzpatrick aptly observed:
No justification can be had for the execution of a child of
ten or eleven years of age in any society that considers
itself civilized. If a child of ten or eleven should not be
executed under any circumstances, then surely a person
who may have a chronological age of twenty, but a mental
and emotional age of ten or eleven, should not be put to
death.78
VI. DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS79
In Stanford, writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the
execution of two defendants, ages sixteen and seventeen, was permissible
under the Constitution. Rejecting the defenses argument that "juveniles,
possessing less developed cognitive skills than adults, are less likely to fear
death [and,] being less mature and responsible, are also less morally
blameworthy, "0 Justice Scalia stated that the juvenile death penalty would
fail under equal protection arguments, rather than the Eighth Amendment,
74. Id. at 308-09.
75. Id. at 340.
76. Id.
77. See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 1, at 41-46.
78. Smith v. Kemp, 664 F.Supp. 500, 507 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
79. See Ved Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders: An Aippraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Riahts, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311 (1993).
80. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377.
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if such arguments could be conclusively proven.8' He stated that the will of
the majority should govern a court's consideration of punishments imposed
by a government. Thus, under the Stanford plurality's ruling, the fate of
juvenile offenders is to be decided solely by the voters of the 50 states.
Pertinent international agreements containing prohibitions on the
death penalty against juvenile offenders include the ICCPR, which states
that a "[s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed
below eighteen years of age . ... "82 Similarly, the American Convention
on Human Rights states that "[clapital punishment shall not be imposed
upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18
years of age ... ."13 Among other pertinent internatinal instruments, the
Fourth Geneva Convention, the Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War8 states, "In any case, the death penalty
may not be pronounced against a protected person [one held by a party to
the conflict or an occupying force of which he/she is not a national] who
was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense.""
The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions specifically
prohibit imposition of capital punishment on those who committed those
crimes while they were under the age of eighteen. The Additional Protocol
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) states in Article 77, paragraph 5, "The death penalty related to
the armed conflict shall not be executed on persons who had not attained
the age of eighteen years at the time the offense was committed."" Also,
the Additional Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of
NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) states, "The death penalty
shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen
years at the time of the offense ....
In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child mandated that
states parties ensure that "[n]either capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences
81. Id. at 378.
82. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 6(5).
83. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 4(5).
84. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 286.
85. Id. art. 68.
86. Geneva Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 77, reprinted in 16
I.L.M 1391, 1425 (1977).
'87. Additional Protocol, Protocol II, art. 6(4), reprinted in Geneva Protocol I, supra note
86, at 1446.
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committed by persons below eighteen years of age. " u  As already
mentioned, in 1983, Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human
Rights abolished the death penalty in time of peace and, in December
1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed
at the abolition of the death penalty.90
Although the United States is not a party to the American
Convention on Human Rights, another organ of the Organization of
American States (OAS), the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, found the United States in 1987 to be in violation of a rule of jus
cogens because of its practice of executing juvenile offenders. 9 The case
involved J. Terry Roach and James Pinkerton, both seventeen at the time
of their crimes, who were sentenced to capital punishment. A complaint
filed by Amnesty International on behalf of Roach argued that the
execution of a juvenile would violate United States obligations under
customary international law and human rights provisions of the OASY
The Commission, and subsequently the OAS Secretary General, appealed
for a stay of Roach's executions.? However, these appeals fell on deaf
ears.
Although the United States has not ratified some of the
international human rights instruments mentioned above, and has made
reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it
can be persuasively argued under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties that the United States reservation is incompatible with the objects
and purposes of the ICCPR and that its signing the instruments obligates it
not to violate their provisions."
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States stands virtually alone among its peer countries in
its practice regarding capital punishment. The obligations it has assumed
under the international human rights instruments are unambiguous. The
88. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 30, art. 37(a).
89. Supra note 21.
90. Supra note 12.
91. Case 9647, Inter-American C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L/V/I.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987),
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 61, 73 (R.E. Norris & T.
Buergenthal eds., 1988).
92. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY
72 (1987).
93. Id. at 72-73.
94. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
5871998]
588 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 4:573
call by the American Bar Association for a moratorium on the death
penalty, its concern over racial inequality in capital sentencing, and its
assertion of the impropriety of execution of mentally retarded and juvenile
offenders should renew the debate within the American legal community
on these critical issues, to the end that a more rational death penalty
jurisprudence emerges, informed as well by international law.
